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Context could be defined as a background information 
or whole situation that enables us to understand the meaning 
of the text. This information might be provided immediately 
before or after the main piece of text that we tried to under-
stand. Language communication poses a lot of ambiguities 
that we routinely resolve using contextual information. Am-
biguities arise from the fact that many words have different 
meanings in different contexts. For example, word root re-
fers to very different objects when we talk about mathemat-
ics (square root), botany (root of a plant) or dentistry (root 
of the tooth). Although it is clear that context plays a signifi-
cant role in semantic processing it receives relatively little 
attention in cognitive science (Barsalou, 1999; 2008).  
Standard assumption in cognitive science is that human 
mind operates as a device for symbol manipulation (Ander-
son, 1983; Laird, Newell, & Rosenbloom, 1987). Symbols 
are conceived as abstract entities which represent or stand 
for some objects, set of objects or state of affair in the world. 
Manipulation over symbolic content is achieved using rules 
such as production or IF-THEN rules. Symbols by them-
selves do not have any relations to the objects they repre-
sent. Take for example a word CAR. This three-letter word 
does not give any indication of how car look like, what is 
its shape or colour. Therefore, the symbols are completely 
de-contextualised from their referent objects. It is believed 
that such context-free representation is useful property for 
cognitive system because it reduces the computational bur-
den and allows the focus to be made on abstract relations 
between symbols.
In the general cognitive architectures like ACT or SOAR, 
knowledge is represented as a set of propositions that relates 
symbols to other symbols (Anderson, 1983; Laird, Newell, 
& Rosenbloom, 1987). For instance, concept CAR is related 
to other concepts such as CAR IS A VEHICLE or CAR 
IS USED FOR DRIVING which looks much like diction-
ary. Problem with this approach is that it is not clear how 
to acquire or learn such a massive repository of definitions. 
In practical applications, propositions are supplied by the 
programmer. Recent advances in computational psycholin-
guistics suggests that word meaning could be derived from 
statistical information about co-occurrence of words in sen-
tences (Burgess & Lund, 1997; Landauer & Dumais, 1997; 
Landauer, Foltz, & Laham, 1998). Basic idea is that words 
that frequently occur together in texts probably share mean-
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ing. By using statistical techniques such as principal com-
ponent analysis or singular value decomposition over large 
database of texts, it is possible to derive high-dimensional 
vector space which represents latent semantic variations 
present in the input. According to Landauer and Dumais 
(1997) and Burgess and Lund (1997) such vectors represent 
the meaning of the words. 
Propositional and statistical approaches to meaning, 
however, ignore the fact that our knowledge is derived from 
sensory experiences and from interactions with the world. 
We know what car is because we saw it or we heard it be-
fore. By relying on the dictionary definitions or statistical 
information alone we will never be able to precisely find 
to which object in the environment words refer to. This is 
known as a symbol grounding problem which prevents any 
artificial system to relate with the world in a meaningful way 
(Glenberg & Robertson, 2000, Harnad, 1990). Furthermore, 
perceptual representation is much richer source of informa-
tion or as a Chinese proverb says “picture is worth thou-
sand words”. If we tried to describe our knowledge about 
car using propositions, we would require enormous amount 
of them to encompass all information present within a sin-
gle picture. These arguments led Barsalou (1999) to seek 
for an alternative theoretical perspective where perception 
plays a central role in higher-level cognition. His theory is 
described in the next section. 
Theory of perceptual symbol systems
According to the theory of perceptual symbol systems 
(PSS), symbols do not lose contact with perceptual traces 
related to the objects they represent. Instead, there are bi-
directional links between symbolic representation and con-
tent of the corresponding perceptual experience. Central 
assumption of the theory is that as perceptual experience 
is able to activate symbolic representation, it is also possi-
ble that symbolic representation reactive memory traces of 
past perceptual experience (Barsalou, 1999, 2008). For in-
stance, when we view a car, perceptual experience related to 
it, activates corresponding category node and we recognise 
this object as an example of a concept CAR. On the other 
hand, when we read or hear a word CAR it should reactive 
the same perceptual traces that were used during perception 
of the object. Such reactivation is called perceptual simula-
tion and according to the PSS it constitutes crucial process 
which enables construction of meaning. Perceptual simula-
tion solves the symbol grounding problem by connecting 
words to the perceptual traces that look like real objects to 
which words refer. Of course, such perceptual reactivation 
is not perfect, vivid recreation of the perceptual representa-
tion. Perceptual simulation could be considered as a form of 
mental imagery. However, there are important differences 
between simulation and imagery. Mental imagery is con-
scious, effortful process which we engage as needed. On the 
other hand, simulation is an automatic, involuntary process 
which is activated whenever we think about certain word 
or concept. Perceptual simulation should be conceived as 
an active process which enables great flexibility in concep-
tual processing. For instance, different simulations could be 
combined in order to form new more complex simulation. 
Attention might help to focus simulation on particular prop-
erty so not all aspects of perceptual experience need to be 
activated in any moment (Barsalou, Simmons, Barbey, & 
Wilson, 2003). 
This view of how meaning of concepts is represented is 
very different from traditional view, and it requires rigor-
ous testing before we can consider it as a serious theoretical 
alternative. Theory of PSS offers a number of testable pre-
dictions. It posits that perceptual mechanisms are activated 
whenever we engage in conceptual processing and there-
fore traces of perceptual activation should be evident even 
during conceptual tasks. If this is true, there should be an 
interaction between perceptual variables and cognitive task 
which participant tries to solve.  
Empirical evidence
In recent years, many investigators reported evidence 
that supports the PSS theory. In the field of language com-
prehension, Zwaan and his collaborators conducted numer-
ous experiments which illustrates how important is percep-
tion for construction of meaning. In one of the earliest study 
they used sentences like
“Ranger saw the eagle on the sky” 
or 
“The ranger saw the eagle in the nest”. 
First sentence implies that eagle is flying so its wings 
are spread. On the other hand, second sentence implies that 
eagle has wings pulled toward the body. Therefore, these 
sentences invoke different mental images of the eagle. If 
these sentences are followed by the real image of the eagle, 
reaction time to the image will be shorter if the content of 
the image match with the content of the sentence (Zwaan, 
Stanfield, & Yaxley, 2002). Similar study showed that the 
same is true for the implied orientation of the object in the 
sentence. For instance, in the sentence “He hammered a 
nail to the wall” implied orientation of the nail is horizontal 
while in the sentence “He hammered the nail in to the floor” 
implied orientation of the nail is vertical. Picture recognition 
after such sentences is faster if the implied orientation of the 
object in the sentence matches with the orientation of the 
object in the picture. Furthermore, there was a strong posi-
tive correlation between reaction time measure in this task 
and standard mental rotation task which suggests a tight link 
between sentence processing and mental imagery (Stanfield 
& Zwaan, 2001).  
With respect to the motion perception, it was shown that 
listening to the sentence which implies certain type of mo-
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tion influences following judgment of the direction of mo-
tion. For instance, if sentence implies motion toward the 
observer as in “The player hurled the softball toward you”, 
participant will be faster in the task of deciding whether the 
two sequentially presented objects are the same or not if the 
second object is larger than the first one. In other words, 
sentence produced perceptual expectation that the second 
object should be larger due to the fact that it approaches 
the observer (Zwaan, Madden, Yaxley &Aveyard, 2004). 
Interestingly, motion perception was completely irrelevant 
for the object comparison task. Still, it produced its effect 
via perceptual simulation of the content of the sentence. Ri-
chardson, Spivey, Barsalou and McRae (2003) showed that 
verbs activate spatial representation consistent with the spa-
tial direction of the referent activity. Verbs like pull or push 
are associated with horizontal dimension due to the fact that 
most of the pushing or pulling is done in left-right dimen-
sion. On the other hand, verbs like lift or sink are associated 
with vertical dimension. When sentences with these verbs 
are presented to participants, their response to the simple 
perceptual task of discriminating shapes (square vs. circle) 
was impaired if the position of the stimulus coincides with 
the verb’s spatial scheme.
Further research revealed that perceptual simulation oc-
curred even at the level of the single word and not just at the 
level of the whole sentence. Zwaan and Yaxley (2003) dis-
covered that relative spatial position of words affects judg-
ments of semantic relatedness based on the usual position of 
their referent objects. If the participants saw the words
SKY
GROUND
They will be faster in deciding that both words are se-
mantically related compared to the situation
GROUND
SKY
Authors conclude that words activate the perceptual 
simulation of the referent object along with its typical spa-
tial position which interacts with the actual position of the 
words. In a similar vein, Šetić and Domijan (2007) showed 
that attention manipulation to the top or the bottom part of 
the visual field also affects semantic judgments. When at-
tention is moved to the top part of the visual display, par-
ticipants were faster to verify that seagull is flying animal 
compared to the response that mouse is not a flying ani-
mal. Opposite pattern were observed when the attention is 
moved to the bottom part of the visual display. Šetić and 
Domijan (2007) also showed that this effect extends to non-
living objects. Furthermore, Estes, Verges and Barsalou 
(2008) showed that words immediately trigger reorientation 
of attention towards the spatial position where we usually 
observe the denoting object. 
Fingerprints of the perceptual simulation are also re-
vealed in conceptual processing. Here, the focus is not on 
the sentence or word processing but on revealing the under-
lying structure of categories that comprise our knowledge. 
Conceptual structure is tested in a property verification task 
where the participants are required to check whether present-
ed property belongs to the category (Solomon & Barsalou, 
2004). Pecher, Zeelenberg and Barsalou (2003) revealed 
that there is a switching cost in property verification task 
when the property is in different modality across succes-
sive trials. For instance, it is easier to check that LEMON 
is SOUR if this task was preceded by the task to verify that 
STRAWBERRY is SWEET compared to the situation when 
the same task (LEMON is SOUR) is preceded by the AIR-
PLANE is LOUD. In the first case, both verifications are 
made within the same modality of taste and there is no time 
difference in completing these verifications. In the second 
case, participants need to change the modality from audi-
tion to taste in order to complete the task and this modality 
switch takes time which incurs longer verification time.  
It is interesting to note that the perceptual simulation 
is not restricted to the standard perceptual attributes such 
as colour, orientation, motion but it extends its influence 
to the emotions and motor planning. Meier and Robinson 
(2004) showed that words for positive and negative emo-
tional states are differentially processed depending on the 
colour of the words or their spatial position. Positive words 
are processed faster when they are presented in white colour 
relative to the presentation in black colour. Also, they are 
processed faster when they are presented in the upper part 
of the visual field. On the other hand, negative words are 
processed faster when they are presented in the black colour 
or when they are presented in lower part of the visual field. 
Therefore, white colour and upper space are associated in 
the human mind with the positive emotions while black col-
our and lower space are associated with negative emotions. 
In a similar vein, Glenberg, Havas, Becker and Rinck (2005) 
showed that participants judged the sensibility of sentences 
with positive emotional content faster when they are in a 
positive mood while they judge faster sentences with nega-
tive emotional content when they are in a negative mood. 
Mood was induced with the simple procedure of facial mim-
icry. Participants were asked to hold pen in the mouth. One 
group was required to hold pen with their lips which induce 
negative mood due to the activation of facial muscles simi-
lar to the expression of negative mood. Another group was 
required to hold the pen with their teeth which induced posi-
tive mood. Comprehending sentences had also effect on the 
motor planning and programming. When the sentence im-
plied movement toward the observer (“Open the drawer.”), 
participants were faster to execute the pull movement with 
their hand. On the other hand, if the sentence implied move-
ment away from the observer (“Close the drawer.”), partici-
pants were faster to execute push movement (Glenberg & 
Kaschak, 2002). This is known as the action-sentence com-
patibility effect and has been replicated in numerous stud-
ies. All these effects are not compatible with propositional 
or statistical conception of the meaning.
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Recent research in neuroscience also supports the claims 
of PSS theory (Martin, 2001; 2007). Chao and Martin (1999) 
used functional brain imaging to show that brain area for 
colour naming is close to the area for colour perception. 
When participants perform property verification task, brain 
areas specialized for processing perceptual attributes also 
become active. Patients with lesions in visual areas tend 
to develop deficits in naming objects that heavily relies on 
visual attributes such as animals. Based on these findings, 
Pulvermuller (1999, 2001) proposed a theory of functional 
word web which is similar to the PSS theory. He suggests 
that words or concepts activated a distributed network of 
areas including sensory areas which encode perceptual rep-
resentations of referent objects.   
Conclusion
Research in perception revealed abundant evidence for 
contextual interactions either within single perceptual at-
tribute or between different attributes. For instance, in light-
ness perception, gray surface lying on the dark background 
will look lighter that the same gray surface on the white 
background. This is well-known simultaneous lightness 
contrast which is attributed to the interactions between lu-
minance information arriving from neighbouring locations 
in the visual field. There are also interactions between per-
ceptual attributes such as the fact that lighter surface will 
appear closer in depth which suggests that lightness changes 
the construction of depth representation. On the other hand, 
research in cognitive psychology, especially those related to 
the study of conceptual processing and language understand-
ing tried to ignore perception as a rich source of information 
and as a context within which conceptual understanding is 
achieved. Advent of the PSS theory and accumulating em-
pirical evidence supporting it, point to the fact that tradi-
tional assumptions about knowledge representation should 
be re-evaluated. 
However, what will be the status of the PSS theory with-
in cognitive science is still a matter of debate. Markman and 
Dietrich (2000) argued that PSS provide an interesting ad-
dition to the traditional view of knowledge representation. 
On the other hand, Barsalou (2008) claims that PSS pro-
vide radically different view and that traditional assump-
tion should be abandoned. Further theoretical and empiri-
cal work is needed to assess this issue. On the theoretical 
ground, it should be noted that PSS is just a verbal theory 
and it lacks mathematical and computational rigor which is 
needed in order to compare it with much more developed 
theories such as ACT or SOAR. On the empirical ground, 
evidence for PSS is accumulating within a limited domain 
of word and sentence processing. It still needs to be seen 
whether similar effects could be found in other domains 
such as thinking, reasoning, decision making and so on. 
Whatever the answers to these challenges will be, theory 
of PSS offers many opportunities for fruitful collaboration 
between research in perception and cognition. 
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